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This paper examines the theory of  civil war and conflict resolution to answer the question, why peace
processes fail or move forward? I will look at peace processes in Colombia in the last five years when negotia-
tion started and then broke with the Revolutionary Armed Forces of  Colombia –FARC- and began with the
United Self-Defence Forces of  Colombia –AUC-. The theory revels the relevance of  economic, political,
external participation and military factor to explain why some peace processes fail while others succeed. For
instance, the failure of  the first peace dialogue with the left-wing guerrilla FARC can be explained by the
military strategy, the role of  violence during the talks and lack of  international participation. By contrast, by
avoiding all sensitive points of the first peace dialogue, AUC won a significant public support and the
government confidence to begin talks. We have thus two recent peace processes in Colombia to analyse: one
failed and one moving forward. Their analysis will help us to answer the opening question of this paper.
RESUMEN
Este trabajo examina la teoría sobre guerras civiles y resolución de conflictos con el fin de contestar la
pregunta: ¿por qué fracasan o progresan los procesos de paz? Se miraron los procesos de paz en Colombia en
los últimos cinco años cuando comenzó y fracasó el proceso de paz con las Fuerzas Armadas Revolucionarias
de Colombia, FARC y comenzaron con las Autodefensas Unidas de Colombia, AUC. La teoría revela la
relevancia de factores económicos, políticos, participación externa y militares para explicar por que fallan o
prosperan los procesos de paz. Por su parte, el fracaso de las negociaciones con las FARC puede explicarse por
razones de estrategia militar, el rol de la violencia durante la negociación y la falta de participación internacional.
De otro lado, evitando todos los puntos sensibles de la negociación inicial, las AUC ganaron apoyo de la
opinión publica y la confianza del gobierno para iniciar los diálogos. De esta forma, tenemos dos procesos
recientes en Colombia para analizar: uno que fallo y el otro que esta progresando. El análisis de estos procesos
puede ayudarnos a contestar la pregunta inicial de este trabajo.
* Trabajo de grado para optar por el título de MSc in Comparative Politics de London School of Economics and
Political Science. Se agradece el apoyo de la Universidad del Rosario y COLCIENCIAS.
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INTRODUCTION
Why do some internal conflicts succeed in reaching a negotiated settlement while in others
the combatants withdraw from the negotiating table and return to war? Why having achieved to
seat opponent parties in a negotiation table some processes fail while other move forwards and
may succeed? Those questions are posed in a growing body of literature on internal conflicts
and peace processes pointing out several reasons for the failures and successes of conflict
resolution efforts. Among those, we may find the type and terms of the settlement, the lack of
third party support, the significance of ethnic and religious identities, and the economic and
political incentives. In addition, a number of sensitive points have been suggested of the peace
process that may difficult or threaten the progress of the process: strategies and objectives of
each party, violence during the peace process and the design of the negotiation agenda.
During the past decade, interest in internal conflict and civil war has increased among schol-
ars. The end of the Cold War moved the analysis from inter-state wars to intra-state wars and
the conditions to bring them to an end through negotiated settlement. Civil wars and internal
conflict are not new phenomena, not even post Cold War phenomena, as some suggest they
have become the predominant form of armed combat in the last half-century.
The case of Colombia’s internal conflict appears in a large number of analyses. The Colombian
internal conflict is challenging as it has lasted for more than half a century, it involves left and
right illegal groups, it has the oldest guerrilla group in Latin America and, as Bejarano suggests
(1999, pp 201), “Colombia is the country where peace negotiations in Latin America began”.1
The Colombian conflict is relevant for the analysis of negotiating civil war in three dimen-
sions. From an international dimension, “there is consensus among analysts that for the first
time [Colombia’s] internal problem is being seen as a threat to the international order not only
the United States and the European powers but also by our neighbours friends. In diplomatic
circles Colombia has earned itself the soubriquets of the “Bosnia of South America” and “Latin
America’s open sore” (Guerrero; 2001, pp 22). In addition, the Colombia’s conflict is in the
context of international campaign against “new enemies”: drug trade and terrorism.
From a regional perspective, Colombia’s conflict is in a context of relatively peaceful post-
Cold War Latin America; guerrilla war continues at full strength in Colombia. The effects of the
conflict are increasingly felt in neighbouring countries in terms of refugees, ecological damage,
and drug and arms trafficking routes. From an internal perspective, the development of the
conflict underlines the interaction of three relevant actors: the left-wing guerrilla, the right-
wing paramilitary and the government. The two cases chosen, the negotiation with the Revolu-
tionary Armed Forces of  Colombia –FARC and the Self-Defence Forces of  Colombia –AUC give lights
to understand the obstacles and strengths in peace negotiation processes.
Colombia has experienced various peace processes at different times. During the eighties
various initiatives of dialogues and negotiations took place. Three middle-range guerrillas signed
1 Since 1982 all president in office initiated peace talks with insurgents groups. The following are the presidents of
Colombia since 1982 (1982-86), Belisario Betancur, (1986-1990) Virgilio Barco, (1990-94) Cesar Gaviria, (1994-98)
Ernesto Samper, (1998-2002) Andrés Pastrana and currently Alvaro Uribe.JUANITA VILLAVECES 5
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peace accords during that decade. However, the two main guerrilla groups, the National Libera-
tion Army –ELN- and FARC continued their violent actions without any real attempt at negoti-
ating. The nineties were a bloody and dirty decade: escalation of violence; shocking violation
of human rights; several increases of internal displacements; political violence that has left a
great number of murders, kidnapping, drug-trafficking and so on, illustrated most of the devel-
opment of the internal conflict. In 1998, president Andrés Pastrana announced a dialogue with
FARC. Three years later the government broke-up negotiations.
Meanwhile, as a response to the guerrilla’s regional power and strategic actions, Colombia
experienced the emergence and strength of numerous right-wing self-defence groups. In the
nineties, such disaggregate groups joined together forming AUC. In December 2002, in a cli-
mate of general scepticism toward negotiation processes, the leader of AUC announced his
interest in dialogue with the government and proposed a potential negotiating agenda. The
government of Álvaro Uribe initiated a set of meetings and declared the beginning of negotia-
tion with the AUC.
The relevance of the period (1998-2003) is the coincidence of some circumstances: two pro-
cesses with opposing armed actors, a change from an endogenous peace negotiation to a more
open negotiation including international actors, the growth of the number of illegal troops and
the failure of one peace process and another with high prospective to progress in the mid-term.
Even though AUC peace process is in progress and it might be difficult to anticipate its
outcome, one can illustrate its development and the existing strength and obstacles to conclude
that this peace process has chances of achieving something. By contrast, the broken peace
process with FARC tells us about the problem of the negotiation, the lack of incentives to
eventually reach an accord and the challenges of starting a new dialogue between the govern-
ment and this rebel group.
To answer the question, why peace processes fail or move forward?, I examined secondary sources,
and I collected information from newspapers, official documents and violence surveys. This
essay aims to analyse the principal thesis about failure and success of peace processes and
discuss the cases of FARC and AUC in the light of the theory.
To address the question, this essay is divided in four sections. The first section presents
the relevant definitions used on the paper, an eclectic theoretical framework on internal
(civil) war negotiation and termination and the relevant hypothesis on the Colombian case.
The second section is a short description of the origins of Colombian violent conflict and
some aspects of its evolution; a characterization of the armed groups and the peace pro-
cesses undertaken in the past five years. The third section interprets the findings in the light
of the theory and discusses the reasons for failure and progress of peace processes in the two
cases. In conclusions I suggest that while the military, third-party’s participation and violent
actions can explain the failure of FARC negotiation they are not sufficient to explain why
AUC negotiation is moving forward. In addition, I highlight the relevance of two elements,
absent in the literature, to explain the progress of peace talks with AUC: “negotiation learn-
ing process” and judicial guarantees.6 WHY PEACE PROCESSES FAIL OR MOVE FORWARD? NEGOTIATIONS IN COLOMBIA WITH FARC AND AUC (2993-2003)
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1. THEORETICAL FRAMEWORK
1.1 DEFINITIONS
The principal terms used are peace process, civil or internal war and rebels. According to Höglund
(2001, pp 5), a peace process is considered to be in progress “when it is publicly known that the
primary parties to the conflict have signalled a willingness to solve the conflict issues through
dialogue”. That is to say, peace process relies on the type of resolution strategies between the
parties and the changing patterns of the process rather than on the specific causes of the con-
flict and the parties conflict behaviour.
Peace negotiation, talk and dialogue will be used as synonyms. They refer to the process followed
by the parties to bargain and to reach an accord of any kind, primarily based on a pre-estab-
lished agenda of negotiation. Talks can include external parties to the conflict such as the
church, international actors, civil society, businessmen, politician and so on.
The more delicate definition is civil war. There is a large debate among Colombian scholars
of the applicability of the term civil war in the case of Colombia.2 Without ignoring the rel-
evance of the discussion, we will say that Colombia experiences a civil war. Following the
Licklider definition, civil war refers to any conflict that satisfies all of the following criteria:
some influential leaders must be concerned about possibly having to live in the same political
unit with their current enemies after the killing stops; there must be multiple sovereignties3 and
large scale violence as battle deaths (above 1,000 per year and at least 5% of casualties on its
opponent). In addition, civil war is a conflict mainly concentrated within national boundaries
where internal participants are involved and external powers might be part of the war and the
peace process. In this essay there will be no distinction between civil war and internal war.
We define rebels as illegal armed groups aiming to overthrow the existing government (rebel-
lion or secession) or attempting to substitute military forces. In addition, rebels or illegal move-
ments have cohesion, organization, territorial control and a minimal support among the society.
Also, we prefer to use the term move forward instead of succeed. Even though in literature the
term success is used in opposition to failure, in the cases chosen it is more accurate to talk of move
forward. In that sense, I define move forward in a peace process, the development of the pre-
negotiation phase where the parties involved establish an agenda of negotiation and advance in
the dialogue reaching some kind of accepted and legitimate accord. In that sense, we will say
that a peace negotiation is succeeding or moving forward when there are positive developments
in the dialogue and consensus among parties. Even though literature defines success as the
negotiated settlement, a ceasefire and re-incorporation into society, in this analysis we do not
use such category. When a negotiation is moving forward there are no guarantees of a ceasefire,
2 A review of the Debate appears in E. Posada Carbo (2001) “Guerra Civil?, Guerra contra los Civiles? Violencia
Generalizada?. Sobre la neturaleza del conflicto interno en Colombia”. Fundacion Ideas para la Paz, (May), in
http://www.ideaspaz.org/publicaciones/download/guerra_civil.pdf
3 Understood as defined by Charles Tilly, population of an area obeying more than one institution –taxes, armies,
and symbols. See Charles Tilly (1978). From Mobilization to Revolution. (Reading: MA: Addison-Wesley).JUANITA VILLAVECES 7
Agosto de 2003
even less of the end of the conflict and the violence in the country, those can be a further
outcome. On the other hand, by failure, I mean the impossibility to reach any type of agree-
ment, the dissolution of the negotiation table and the withdrawing from the dialogue of at least
one of the parties.
1.2 THE THEORY
The literature on internal war (civil war) termination and conflict resolution can be catego-
rized into two main groups: The first one, rational choice approach, considers negotiated settle-
ment as a function of economic, institutional or military conditions that may encourage
combatants to initiate dialogues. In this perspective, the success of negotiation will be closely
related with the presence of specific conditions. The second set of theories, conflict resolution
techniques,4 underlines the ability of parties to solve their conflicts. In other words, once the
dialogue is initiated, the success of the process will rely on the ability to put an end to the inner
reasons of war. The final set of theories highlights the interaction of certain conditions that
may foster or block the negotiation.
In the rational choice theory one can include the work of Shugart, Berdal and Malone,
Zartman, Mason and Fett, Collier, and Fearon among others. In general, the literature is based
on the idea that the decision to negotiate or not is determined by the relative costs and benefits
of a unilateral victory or a negotiated settlement. In that sense, the relation of cost and benefit
will depend on different type of elements such as economic viability, durability of the conflict,
hurting stalemate, institutional reforms and so on.
Shugart, from an institutionalist perspective, considers the rational calculation of ending
a conflict by democratic means, that is, political reform. According to Shugart (1992, pp
122), “institutional change may lower barriers to entry for new participants in the political
market, therefore, negotiations over the institutional rules of the game are usually crucial
components of any electoral settlement”. In that sense the greater the chances of electoral
incorporation the lower the costs of continuing war. Here, the regime and rebels calculation
costs interact in the outcome.5 The step from war to settlement will occur if “for one side the
cost of competition should become lower than the cost of conflict” creating a situation of
stalemate that may lead to political and electoral reforms and ultimately the settlement. If
government’s costs of suppression are greater than costs of toleration, then the reform will
be one that guarantees electoral security and lower barriers to rebel participation. If the
rebel’s cost of participation is lower than the cost of resistance, there will be an institutional
reform that provides guarantees to the governing parties that their interest will be protected
in the new electoral competition.
4 This category was developed by Markus Kornprobst (2002). ‘Explaining Success and Failure of War to Peace
Transitions: Revisiting the Angolan and Mozanbican Experience’. The Journal of Conflict Studies. 22 (2) (fall), pp
58-61.
5 According to Shugart, an institutional reform decrease the cost of resistance of rebels in exchange of participation
and decrease the cost of suppression of the regime in exchange of toleration. (T<S and P<R where T: Toleration;
S: Suppression: P: Participation and R: Resistance)8 WHY PEACE PROCESSES FAIL OR MOVE FORWARD? NEGOTIATIONS IN COLOMBIA WITH FARC AND AUC (2993-2003)
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Zartman analyses internal conflict by looking what can change the parties’ behaviour due to
preferable alternatives. Warring parties can present pain, fatigue and boredom from being at war
and lower their benefits from the conflict. They may also have new incentives that increase
their war-benefits. In that sense, the set of incentives will change according to the parties’
behaviour. Zartman also suggests that timing can change the effects of incentives. As Zartman
(2001, pp 298) says, “disincentives and incentives can come in two forms, as current or as
contingent modifiers of present values … Contingent disincentives and incentives must be
credible, both as to their own feasibility and as to the willingness of the other party to imple-
ment them”. Political reform and hurting stalemate are two main components that change
behaviour and incentives of parties. The prospect of an inclusive political reform, accommo-
dation and devolution can reduce the benefits of war that is increases the chances of negotia-
tion. On the other side, mutually hurting stalemate can get the process started by pushing
parties to listen to incentives and negotiate. In addition, both type of incentives require being
credible. Mediation of a third party may provide credibility to the incentives.
Manson and Fett assume a simple model of rational calculation over the utility and cost of
war and settlement. As they say (1995, pp 549), “the likelihood that both the government and
the rebels will agree to a settlement rather than continue to fight will vary depending on each
party’s estimate of its probability of victory, its expected payoffs from victory versus those
from a settlement, the rate at which it absorbs costs of conflict and its estimate of how long
will take to achieve victory”. They suggest that the probability of settlement will depend pri-
marily on the duration of the conflict, on the size of government army; uncertain effects on the
negotiation settlement are the casualty rates and the role of third parties, the points at the stake
of the conflict have almost null effects on the decision of a negotiated settlement.6
From the perspective of economic factors to end a civil war, Collier states that civil wars
occur where rebel organizations are financially viable, mostly in countries with low income, low
growth and economies based principally on the export of commodities.7 In that sense, the way
to end a civil war depends on how public policies reduce the economic risk factors: change the
pattern of economy, diversify the production and international cooperation to reduce the inci-
dence of illegal trades: sanctions making the economic and military circumstances of rebellion
more difficult. In addition, Berdal and Malone expose the political economy of civil war (rebels
economic system and the opportunities generated by war) and they suggest that one of the
ways to end war is to “deactivate the belligerents’ financial spigot” (2000, pp 14). The greater
the benefits of war economy the less chances to initiate a negotiated settlement.
Rational choice perspective seems to narrow in analysing an internal conflict. For instance,
structure of cost will be constrained by lack of information; actors do not have all information
and may mislead their calculation. In addition, by looking at the process with one feature,
leaving aside other factors, the analysis is far from reality, where actors are interacting and more
than one element affect parties decisions.
6 See David Mason and Patrick Fett (1996) ‘How Civil Wars End: A Rational Choice Approach’. The Journal of
Conflict Resolution. 40 (4) (Dec), pp 561-564.
7 He suggests that political agendas have been replaced by economic agendas.JUANITA VILLAVECES 9
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The second set of theories of conflict resolution techniques highlights the way to resolve
the issues driving the war. The main points to facilitate the negotiation are related with the
identity of the combatants, the divisibility of the stakes and the presence of third party media-
tor. For the purpose of this essay I will not focus on identity issues.8
The divisibility of the stake depends on the nature of the conflict: secessionist or political
driven. The first one may facilitate a division but the last one creates difficulties in the final
accord. The more divisible the stakes over which the combatants are fighting, the more likely
the war is to end in a negotiated settlement.
In terms of third parties, the success or failure of conflict negotiation vary directly with the
presence or absence of an outside mediator. According to Rothchild, third parties may regulate
the use of coercive (diplomatic pressures and incentives, sanctions and military force) and
noncoercive (purchase, insurance, legitimation and promise of economic support) incentives in
the process of prevention and solution of a conflict. In addition, Walter suggests that third parties
have an active role in terms of mediation, verification and coercion to create a credible commit-
ment between the parties. Moreover, she suggests that the success of mediation go beyond the
accord and need to involve third parties in the peace-building process. Besides, she exposes two
critical barriers to civil war settlement: short-term demobilisation and rebuilding national armed
force and long-term devolution of rebels controlled territory. As she says (2002, pp 21),
“This dual process creates two opportunities for exploitation, and this is the reason so many
civil wars fail to end with successful settlements … Settlements of civil wars, therefore, have
the unintended and unfortunate effect of forcing factions through a highly risky implementa-
tion period that may leave them significantly worse off than they would have been had they
dept their armies and continued to fight”.
Third-party participation is a growing necessity in a peace process. This can come from international actors or
organized national groups. However, third-party participation is not a condition sine qua non. It may foster
confidence but it also may reduce it. Third-parties also have incentives and interests on the conflict resolution,
in that sense, it would not be a philanthropic intervention per se but may be reliant to specific interests.
The last set of theories emphasises the effects of a combination of factors to end an internal
conflict. Among those are Darby and Mac Ginty and Höglund. According to Darby and Mac
Ginty (2000, pp 12), “the success or failure of any emerging peace process depends on the
interaction between a wide range of variable influences”. From this point of view there are six
main themes that influence the peace process: violence and security issues; economic factors;
role of external actor; popular responses; symbols and ritual,9 progress towards political/con-
stitutional agreement. Some of them described above but three features complement the analy-
sis: violence and security; popular support and political/constitutional agreement
According to Höglund, a peace process is a changing and fluctuant process and one of the
issues that alter its dynamic is the existence of violence during the peace process. As she sug-
8 The reason is the absence of identity driven forces in the Colombian conflict.
9 This feature points out the relevance of symbols and rituals especially in ethnic and religious conflict. However, as
Colombian conflict lack of ethnic and religious categories, we will not focus on this theme without neglecting its
relevance to understand other conflicts and negotiations.10 WHY PEACE PROCESSES FAIL OR MOVE FORWARD? NEGOTIATIONS IN COLOMBIA WITH FARC AND AUC (2993-2003)
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gests, violence might be part of the strategy of the parties to achieve their goals or might be the
outcome of dissidences and differences within the party. “Hence, one of the potential ob-
stacles to successful conflict resolution is violence which takes place during a peace process”
(2001, pp 2). In her view, incidents of violence have different effects on the negotiation de-
pending on who use violence, timing and targets. She suggests that violence “by parties inside
a peace process” is more likely to dislocate the negotiations, than violence by parties who are
outside the peace process. This type of violence is seen as lack of commitment toward the
peace process and may lead other parties to withdraw their support to the negotiations. In
addition, Höglund follows Pillar’s10 approach in respect of timing. Both suggested that the use
of violence might be expected to increase in the final phase of the negotiation process, when
the settlement is close to its establishment.
As stated by Darby and Mac Ginty, popular responses may also affect the outcome of the
process in the ability of parties to mobilise popular opinion and strengthen its support. Public
opinion can influence political initiatives on the peace process. It can generate both, a strong
support to the peace process and the opposite, a negative view of dialogues and negotiated
initiatives. Public opinion is changing and highly influenced by violent actions.
This final set of theories gives a wider view of the process. Success, progress and failures of
peace process are explained by the interaction of different variables. By including institutions,
external actors, means and economic conditions, they acknowledge the complexity of the war
and, by extend, of peace process.
1.3 COLOMBIA’S ACADEMIC DISCUSSION
The academic discussion on Colombia’s internal conflict has primarily focused on the social
and political meaning of Colombian violence, what has been called violentología11 that has brought
several hypothesis of the cause of the conflict.12 However, in the past few years, the analysis
has focused on the dynamic of the peace process and the possible ways to achieve a successful
negotiated settlement or at least, an appropriate peace process methodology to address a nego-
tiated political solution of the violence and conflict. Bejarano’s “Agenda para la Paz”13 is the
first, systematic analysis to evaluate the feasibility of a negotiation process in Colombia.
The debate around the failure of the peace process with FARC and the open possibilities
with AUC dialogues points out four arguments: the scheme of the negotiation and the govern-
ment position; the structure of the political system; stalemate, international intervention and
the negotiation agenda of the peace process.
10 Paul Pillar (1983). Negotiating Peace. War Termination as a Bargaining Process. (Princeton: Princeton University
Press), pp 103.
11 Violentología: Colombian school specialist on national violence.
12 A good review on the different hypothesis of the causes and origin of the violence of Colombia can be found in
Fernán González et al (2002). Violencia Política en Colombia. De la nación fragmentada a la construccion del
Estado. Bogotá: Cinep, pp. 22-46.
13 Jesus Antonio Bejarano was a professor at the National University of Colombia, and since 1990 he get involved in
peace processes in Colombia. He was killed in 1999, while teaching at the University by an extremist right organi-
zation that were against anyone that promote and be part of dialogues with their enemies, the guerrilla.JUANITA VILLAVECES 11
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González et al and Pécaut, suggest that the peace process was a dual strategy: politically and
military. In short the strategy of FARC was war amidst peace. This was the format of the
negotiation: no ceasefire, a demilitarised zone, and an extensive structural change agenda that
instead of allow a proactive dialogue, promotes FARC unwillingness to achieve pacts. In addi-
tion, the format of the negotiation increased FARC’s legitimacy on their territory, strengthened
their military power and as a result, closed the possibility of peace and opened a new door to
war (González: 2002, pp 75).
Hartlyn and Shugart suggest that the success of negotiated settlement in Colombia was a
result of political transformation, some transfer of power and potential inclusion in an opened
political system.
By contrast, Sanin suggests that FARC had not incentives to reach an accord and preferred
to keep arms. Parties are in an “undesirable equilibrium” between symmetrical forces, where
both parties’ best alternative is to negotiate while engaging militarily. In order to shape the
relation of forces and move forward, Sanín suggests it is necessary to weaken FARC’s sources
of financing so that the rebel movement will find itself closer to a defeat and will choose to
negotiate. She considers that the Plan Colombia is a feasible way and a credible threat to under-
mine FARC’s finance weakening their military apparatus and inducing FARC “toward moving
to concede”.
Rangel also points out the failure of FARC process due to their military strategy. The nego-
tiation in the midst of war is FARC strategy to gain time to strength their military strategy and
to extend the political support. In that sense, the first alternative of FARC is to win militarily
and if this does not result, they will consider the signing of an accord.
Chernick suggests that the negotiation model with FARC lacks credibility. The role of inter-
national organization may lead to reinitiate the peace process. Colombia has not counted with
strong international commitment with its peace processes. Most of the participation was ori-
ented to the war against the drug, perception that misled the real need of creating confidence
and fostering a proactive dialogue.
Bejarano and Leguizamo share their views. They suggest that the issues stated on the agenda
are relevant in the outcome. That is to say, that some objectives can be easily negotiated while
others take time and demand more work. Leguizamo suggests that structural reforms cannot be
the starting point of discussion, and the case of FARC shows that the first point of negotiation
was the social and economic reform, specifically the unemployment problem. To achieve some-
thing, negotiations may begin with issues that are relevant for both parties and that have chances
to a positive outcome that shows the willingness and commitment to the peace talks.
Overall, the theory points out six components to determine why peace processes fail or
move forward: economic perspective, military incentives, third-party participation, political
system, public support and violence. To examine the negotiation in Colombia in the resent
years, I focus on the six factors and two more: learning process and judicial incentives.
The next section is a short review of Colombian conflict and introduces the negotiation with
the Revolutionary Armed Forces of Colombia –FARC- and with the United Self-Defence of
Colombia –AUC–.12 WHY PEACE PROCESSES FAIL OR MOVE FORWARD? NEGOTIATIONS IN COLOMBIA WITH FARC AND AUC (2993-2003)
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2. COLOMBIA’S CONFLICT
2.1 HISTORICAL BACKGROUND
There is a consensus that current Colombia’s violence and conflict is a heritage of the period
known as La Violencia (1948-58). During that time, the confrontation between the two major
political parties, liberals and conservatives, exacerbated the conflict especially in rural areas and
took the lives of at least 180.000 Colombians.14 A consociational accord put end to the conflict
and fostered a period of political calm, the Frente Nacional (national front), 16 years of sharing-
power between liberals and conservatives. Meanwhile, during the sixties, a former peasant self-
defence movement that fought during the days of La Violencia, gave birth to FARC.15 As Gutierrez
(2003, pp 5) suggests, “the present days guerrillas have existed since 1964 and have their roots in
an earlier protracted confrontation, 1948-1958 … during more than a decade they [FARC] were
marginal, and only very rarely came to the centre stage of the country’s public life”.
The years of the National Front brought peace to the country. However, the consociational
pact ended in 1978 and the stability of the political system at the local level proved insufficient
to keep peace. During the eighties the intensity of the armed conflict changes from a particu-
larly rural conflict to a generalized violence. In the past decade, in addition to the generaliza-
tion of the conflict, new actors appeared in the scenario changing the traditional guerrilla dynamic
of the conflict. Currently, there are four relevant (in number and action) actors: FARC, ELN,
AUC and the legal Armed Forces.
During the past decades, there have been several rapprochements between the government
and the insurgents groups. FARC has participated in some talks without reaching any accord. In
1982, the president Betancur initiated a rapprochement with the guerrillas groups but without
any success. At this time, FARC established a political front, the Patriotic Union –UP–, that
gained some legitimacy in the legislative elections of 1986; it was a sort of truce with FARC,
yet the UP disappeared from the political scene.16
By 1990s the coincidence of national and international circumstances (collapse of Eastern
European communism, the advances of Salvadoran peace process and the inclusive constitu-
tional convention at the national level), lead to a debilitation of some Colombia’s guerrillas
14 See: Washington Office on Latin America (1989) Colombian Besieged: Political Violence and State Responsibility.
Washington: Washington Office on Latin America. Chapter 1 and J. Henderson (1985) Cuando Colombia se
desangró. (Bogotá: El Áncora Editores).
15 In particular, the core of FARC’s leading cadres was already active in t1950s civil war, as the left wing of the liberal
guerrillas. In the early 1960s it became a peasant self-defence organization actives in rural areas. After a process of
radicalisation (1970s) FARC became close to the pro-Soviet Communist Party, and so it remained until the fall of
the Berlin Wall.
16 Unión Patriótica (UP), the political movement of the guerrilla, created in the 1980s. The UP campaigned in FARC
dominated territory and got some posts in regional elections. The UP was methodologically murdered person-by
–person by violent right organizations [among others self-defence groups] and many claims with the help of state
security forces. More than 3,500 members and partisans were murdered (among those two presidential candi-
dates). See: Fernando Giraldo (2001). Democracia y Discurso Político de la Unión Patriótica. Bogotá: Centro
Editorial Javeriano.JUANITA VILLAVECES 13
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movements. After several failed attempts, the peace process led to an accord with middle-range
insurgent movements17 but none with FARC. In 1991, the government entered in negotiations
with a joint organization of guerrillas, the Simón Bolívar Guerrilla Coordinator –CGSB- that in-
cluded FARC. This negotiation also failed after a major violent incident perpetrated by the
guerrilla.18 FARC went back to the mountain and sharpened their armed confrontation.19
During the nineties, the growth of illicit drug trade, Colombia being the largest grower of
illicit coca and manufacturer of processed cocaine reshaped the dynamics of the conflict. Vio-
lence today is three times greater: social inequality, military stronger guerrillas, internally dis-
placed people,20 rise of kidnapping as armed movements financial scheme21 of political violence
that had been claiming on average more than 700 lives a month since 1988.22 In addition, self-
defence groups emerged in reaction to the guerrilla in areas where the state was unable to
provide security to the population,23 that is, their raison d’être. Self-defence groups are the result
of an alliance between local elite, landowners and narco-dealers and some spheres of the Co-
lombian state, primarily the armed force.
As Chernick (1999, pp 161) suggests, “the contradictory realities of the late 1990s made a
negotiated settlement between the government and the guerrillas more difficult –and more
necessary”.
Domination of territory appears to be the core military strategy of illegal armed groups.
Many areas of the country are either dominated by some group or under active dispute. As
Garfield and Arboleda (2003, pp 41) suggest, “the inability of the State, through the military
and police, to exercise a monopoly of force and protect people and property has permitted the
illegal armed actors [guerrilla and paramilitaries] to move into these areas and exercise author-
ity”. Moreover, Chernick (2003, pp 244) states that the “rapid expansion of the paramilitary
groups transformed a classic guerrilla insurgency that targeted social elites and state actors into
a multipolar war among leftists insurgents, right-wing paramilitaries and the state”
17 In 1989 the M-19 demobilized. In 1990 three smaller guerrillas laid down: The People Liberation Army (EPL), the
Quintín Lame and the Revolutionary Workers’ Party (PRT).
18 The kidnap and assassination of a former government minister.
19 It is significant the way FARC has growth since 1980 when they had 1,000 battle men to around 18,000 fighters in
2002 and presence in about 1,000 municipalities out of 1,024.
20 According to CODHES, there are more than 2,5 million internally diplaced people in Colombia since 1985, with an
intensification in the late nineties. CODHES (2003). Boletin para la consultoria de los Derechos humanos y
Desplazamiento, no 4, (Bogotá), in http://www.codhes.org.co/
21 According to the Departamento Nacional de Planeación, the number of kidnappings had rose in 85.7%, from
1,608 in 1996 to 2,986 in 2002 with a peak in 2000 of 3,706. See. Cifras de la Violencia 1996-2002. Direccion de
Justicia y Seguridad.
22 Cited by Chernick (1999), Data Bank of the Comisión Inter-Congregacional de Justicia y Paz, Bogota. Figures
include political assassinations, collective massacres, assassinations presumed to be political, “social cleansing”,
death combats, disappearances and death under obscure circumstances.
23 About 140 municipalities out of 1042 lack of state presence, and occupied by any armed actor. Pécaut (2003).
Midiendo Fuerzas. Balance del Primer año del gobierno de Alvaro Uribe Vélez. (Bogotá: Editorial Planeta), pp 97.14 WHY PEACE PROCESSES FAIL OR MOVE FORWARD? NEGOTIATIONS IN COLOMBIA WITH FARC AND AUC (2993-2003)
Borradores de investigación - No. 35
FARC AND AUC’S ZONES OF INFLUENCE
2.2 FARC NEGOTIATING WITH PASTRANA’S GOVERNMENT
The rapprochement between FARC and the government took place in 1998 during the presi-
dential campaign. The candidate Andrés Pastrana had several secret meetings with the guerrilla
leader, Manuel Marulanda. Pastrana’s strategy was to win the elections and he showed his
willingness to negotiate with FARC after several secret meetings with the leader of the move-
ment. Once in office, the parties established the conditions to initiate negotiations. There is a
consensus that the government conceded too much without demanding anything. FARC de-
manded the demilitarisation of a region of Colombia [42,000 square kilometre area],24 known
as Zona de Distension (demilitarised zone), to remove some officers from the military, to crack
down on the paramilitary, non-ceasefire or negotiating in the midst of war.
24 3.67% of the Colombian territory, an area almost the size of Switzerland and the largest area in hands of FARC
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On 9 January 1999 the peace dialogues were officially inaugurated. However, since the
beginning Marulanda made clear that his movement had more to demand than to offer. The
inauguration day he was absent, leaving the president next to an empty seat.
The negotiation’s agenda25 shows the parties interest on the talks. Talks started after defining
this agenda and the bargain began with the fifth point (economic and social structure), specifi-
cally economic reforms concerning unemployment. During the following three years, the nego-
tiation stuck on the same point without getting an accord, or moving to another point.
It can be said that FARC’s interests on negotiating with the government was:
1. As Marulanda suggested, the new peace process opened a new political opportunity to find
solutions to the social crisis26 that is to transform the social, political and economic structure.
2. To achieve a government commitment to rein in paramilitary groups.
The tacit and tactic strategy of the negotiation scheme (no ceasefire and a wide demilitarised
zone) was:
1. To build and strengthen a FARC controlled strategic corridors between the centre of the
country (demilitarised zone) and the north and southwest of Colombia that permitted a
rapid movement of troops, weapons and illegal trade.
2. FARC was using the negotiation time to train and increase its forces for the continuation of
offensive strategy in order to force the government to agree to negotiation terms. As Marulanda
said, FARC will continue the struggle “until victory”.27
3. FARC was seeking its control of the grass-roots levels of government: municipalities and
rural areas. “Small towns and rural areas are, for the most part, highly vulnerable to guerrilla
infiltration […] there is no police presence in one fourth of the country’s municipios and
corregimientos”. Rabasa et al (2001, pp 50).
4. To consolidate their control of coca regions (south and east).
5. To expand their operations to the whole territory of Colombia in order to disperse the mili-
tary force and reduce its ability to regain the military initiative.
What was wrong? The talks initiated ill. From the beginning, FARC showed their unwilling-
ness to bargain and presented them in a too strong way so that the government had to fulfil their
demands if seeking to negotiate. They suspended the talks three times and pushed the govern-
ment to maintain and extend the deadline of the demilitarised zone without counterpart com-
25 The agenda “A Common Agenda for Change Toward a New Colombia” contained the following points: 1.
Negotiated Political Solutions; 2. Protection of Human Rights Is a Responsibility of the State; 3. Integral Agrarian
Policies; 4. Exploitation and Conservation of Natural Resources; 5. Economic and Social Structure; 6. Justice
Reforms the Fight Against Corruption and Drug-Trafficking; 7. Political Reform and the Expansion of Democ-
racy; 8. Reform of the State Agreements on International Humanitarian Law; Armed Forces International Rela-
tions Formalizing Agreements Signed 6 May 1999 in La Machaca, (Demilitarised Zone).
26 Cited in Semana, No. 871, January 11, 1999.
27 Cited in A. Rabasa and Chalk Peter (2001). Colombian Labyrinth The Synergy of Drugs and Insurgency and Its
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mitment. Pastrana’s government tried to keep the talks going at any price, even of fulfilling
almost all guerrilla demands without achieving some accord.
In addition, the approval of the Plan Colombia28 opened the gap between parties and dimin-
ished the weak confidence-build among them. According to FARC, the Plan Colombia contra-
dicted the government position. They suggested that on the one hand, government has peace
willingness and, on the other hand, government followed a peace diplomacy aiming to strengthen
public force and to fight against narcotrafficking, that is a violent initiative.
Any result? An explicit result, and perhaps the only accord achieved: the exchange of 14
guerrilla members’ prisoners by 350 policies and military kidnapped, some of them since
more than 3 years.
In terms of the agenda, no more was achieved. By contrast, an implicit outcome of fruitless
peace negotiation was the shared belief of the unfeasibility of negotiating in the midst of war.
Public opinion saw guerrilla attacks and violence as a cynical behaviour of FARC toward the
negotiation talks. AUC took advantage of the failed peace process and learned from it.
In addition, the government of Andrés Pastrana faced too many constraints to get along
with the talks. The Armed Forces was divided between supporters and opponents of the gov-
ernment policy. While the president was engaged in talks, the military were suspicious of such
negotiation and continued their military strategy. In that sense, the Armed Forces, the guerrilla
and the paramilitaries limited the government purpose of achieving military presence in the
whole territory. Instead of achieving legitimacy, president Pastrana expended three years loos-
ing his credibility and reducing the legitimacy of the state.
2.3 AUC
The origin of paramilitary groups is particular in the Colombian case. The term “paramilitaries”
refers to elements of security forces with some military capabilities and/or groups that are
tolerated, supported or acted under state agents complicity. However, the Colombian
paramilitaries do not fit totally in this definition. They are illegal groups independent from the
state and organized and financed by civilian sectors. They are, in general, counterinsurgent
civilian groups.29 They are known as paramilitaries and/or self-defence groups (synonymous in
the case of Colombia).
Moreover illegal forces, self-defence groups have counted with some periods of legality. The
more recent event of legalization was the creation of the cooperatives CONVIVIR. Those
28 The president Pastrana reinitiated relations with the United States after four years of de-certification policy toward
Colombia. In 2000, after several meeting the U.S Congress approved $1.3 billion to support of Plan Colombia. Of
that, $911 million was to reinforce the war against the drug (aerial fumigation, destruction of coca labs and military
training and strengthening), $106 million to support alternative programs and the remaining $302 million to
human rights and justice. Behind the logic of the Plan Colombia, there is an idea that guerrilla are major drug
trafficking dealers, so by eliminating the drug trafficking Colombia will achieve two goals, end of illicit traffic and
a victory over the guerrilla.
29 See: A. Rangel (2001). Guerra Insurgente. Conflictos en Malasia, Peru, Filipinas, El Salvador y Colombia. (Bogotá:
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were the legal creation of civil armed groups that cooperated with the public force to defend
and protect some regions out of army presence.30 The paradox is that the governor of Antioquia
(a state of Colombia) who legalized those civilian armed groups is the current president, Álvaro
Uribe Vélez.
Self-defence organizations are far less cohesive than the guerrillas. Recently, groups have clus-
tered under an umbrella organization, the Autodefensas Unidas de Colombia –AUC-. AUC brought
some central coordination, funding and coherent doctrine. According to Richani (2002, pp 108):
“The leadership of AUC is a loose coalition of different private armies with common class
and political interests in defending the socio-economic order in their fight against not only the
armed insurgency buy the leftist political groups and by and large the democratic forces and
human right groups”.
During the negotiation between FARC and the government, paramilitaries militarily target
both, government and guerrilla. Even in the battlefront, they managed enlarged their troops,
military power and territorial control.31 The scheme of the negotiation with guerrilla’s move-
ments exaggerates their raison d’être. When peace negotiation broke up, paramilitaries continued
their violent actions along the country. However, the election and beginning of Uribe’s admin-
istration in 2002 reshape their strategy. They reduce violence, from massacres to selective
assassinations. The first of December, about 4 month after Uribe took office, the leader of
AUC declared the ceasefire and the government announced the initiation of rapprochement to
negotiate demobilization. What is behind the change of strategy?
1. To obtain a blanket pardon for major drug traffickers inside AUC and amnesty of massacres
and violence associated with the paramilitary group.
2. To legalize their growing economic activity (agricultural sector).
3. To join the army and together fight against their mutual enemy, the left-guerrilla, and pre-
serve the status quo.
Beyond the political success of negotiate with an armed actor and initiate a peace process,
Uribe’s government benefits from the talks because military duty will be targeting one front
instead of two and, in the context of negotiations, talks with FARC will be easier. However,
the main obstacle to reach a future accord is to negotiate with a group nationally and interna-
tionally perceived as the “symbol of barbarous in Colombian war”.32
This short description opens the question: why FARC peace process fail and what is happen-
ing with negotiation with AUC?
30 Created by the Decree 356 of 11 Mars 1994.
31 There is no consensus on the exact number of fighters. According to Chernick, they are 8,150 and according to the
Leader of AUC they are about 13,000. However, what matters is the extraordinary growth since 1997. They almost
doublet in size during this time. See M Chernick (2001). ‘The dynamics of Colombia’s three-dimensional war’
Conflict, Security and Development, 1 (1), pp 95. and, Semana (2003), ‘Habla Mancuso’ Semana, August 11-18
2003.
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3.  WHY FAILURE? WHY MOVE FORWARDS? : FINDINGS
Learning from the theory presented above, I will analyse the two cases by considering eight
factors: First, the economic incentives to negotiate. As drug trade increases and involves the
dynamic of both armed groups, it might be an association between financial resources and
negotiation. Second, military strategy. Third, third-party intervention in different roles. Fourth,
political perspective; that is, the expectation of political participation. Fifth, public support to
the negotiation. And Sixth, the presence of violence during the peace process.
In addition, there are two issues not mentioned in the literature that give light to the ques-
tion of failure or progress of peace negotiation: the role of judiciary system and a learning
‘negotiation’ process. Both complement the analysis specifically in the case of AUC.
3.1 ECONOMIC PERSPECTIVE
The economic perspective is related to opportunities to get funding from illegal activities. In
the case of Colombia, narcotic activities, where most of the rebels’ income comes from:
 “The coca and heroin export booms have altered the resources, alliances, and social relations of both the
guerrillas and the armed forces. They have transformed a polarised armed conflict between two sides [guerrillas
and military] into one in which multiple groups and sectors are armed and, depending on the nexus of social
relations in a given region, are allied or in conflict with each other”. Chernick, (1999, pp 173).
Drug trade has reshaped the logic of the conflict, increased the capability of armed groups
and led to expansion, consolidation and strength. FARC and AUC incomes from illegal narcotic
activities are approximately 40% for each of them.33
Can we conclude that the existence of illegal financial activities creates incentives to stay in
war and disincentives to negotiate as Berdal and Malone suggest? No. Illicit activities are a fact in
Colombian civil war but not a tradition. Both groups are extracting a high profit from such busi-
nesses but may find other sources of financing (kidnapping, extortion, oil theft and war taxes).
The theory suggests that rebels behave with economic rationality and will continue at war
moved by the possibility of high profits. That is, they are moved by greed, grievances being just
a strategy to gain support. However, the theory is narrow and deterministic to explain what
may happen inside the group. In the case of FARC, there are other rationales beyond economic
motivations affecting their position toward peace negotiation. Gutierrez (2003, pp16) suggests,
FARC “emerged before big scale rent seeking was possible”, they have survived by other means
before getting involved in drug trade.
What are their motivations? FARC are not homogeneous. Ideological leaders: Marulanda,
Reyes and Cano claim to represent peasant and popular interests; they aspire to a reform bring-
ing equity by political and economics means including agrarian reform and democratic plural-
ism. FARC maintain their ideology since 1964, when the movement was born. However, the
proliferation of illicit activities and the benefit derived from them have reshaped internal struc-
33 Richani (2002), pp 64 and Pécaut (2003), pp 138. Neither FARC nor AUC are nowadays drugs processors. They
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ture of FARC. Historical leaders and ideology remain strong and were defended during the
negotiation, yet internal fractures are natural in a movement with approximately 20,000 com-
batants and 60 fronts. Mono Jojoy, leader of the East Block has shown differences with Marulanda
and Reyes. Specifically, Jojoy has shown interest in pursuing military and economic power in its
zone of control separating himself from central orders. The fronts he commands are regularly
accused of being particularly barbarous and drug-dealers.
That may suggest that there is not a unique rationale inside FARC. The economic hypoth-
esis suggests such uniqueness and explains war and peace outcomes by the prevailing rationale.
Thus, in the case of FARC one can say that they respond to two rationales: grievance and
greed. Historical leaders and factions are closer to grievances and saw illegal activities as means
to achieve their goals: rebellion, military victory and political transformation. By contrast, frag-
mentation has led other parts of FARC to follow economic motivation: thus, they have more
incentives to at war than to negotiate, and took advantage of the negotiation period to strengthen
themselves militarily in order to defend coca controlled territory and processors labs. In spite of
some internal division, one can say that Marulanda’s ideology is dominant in the core of FARC.
In that sense, one cannot conclude that the existence of economic financial sources were a
sufficient reason for failure in negotiation and preferring war. The development of the peace
process showed that FARC was aiming at military victory and structural reforms and not only
at keeping a lucrative economic activity as an immense source of income. Their main points
have been constant in their three attempts at negotiation.
As a matter of fact, the peace dialogues with Pastrana’s government stuck in the economic
reforms issue attempting to solve unemployment in Colombia. Moreover, FARC accepted the
need to eradicate coca crops but were reluctant to use aerial fumigation. They defended manual
eradication and alternative programs. Why would they negotiate and strengthen their military
apparatus if just motivated by greed? The answer is in their division and the existence of
powerful fractions looking for economic profits, besides the main ideology, for which economic
activities are a mean, not the reason of war.
From AUC’s perspective, it is not clear how economic incentives work. They have been
involved in drug business and are partly financed by narcotrafficking. However, they are also
involved with legal activities such as cattle ranches, sugar and palm crops. They may be inter-
ested in cleaning their gains and continue their legal activities. A negotiated settlement will
allow paramilitary members to return to their businesses and invest from the surplus of past
drug activities. In that way, their decision to negotiate is not related to their financial weakness
but to the future possibilities to develop permitted activities already managed by them.
Thus, economic weakening is not a sufficient disincentive for war and an incentive to nego-
tiate. The economic hypothesis may work in situations of criminal groups such as mafias but
does not explain sufficiently the cases of FARC and AUC in Colombia.
3.2 MILITARY PERSPECTIVE
 “The mutually hurting stalemate that is almost a prerequisite for negotiation or even for mediation is charac-
teristically absent, yet neither side has the power –with rare exceptions- to dislodge the other fully. Fluctuating
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Neither FARC nor AUC has presented a hurting stalemate with the Armed Force. During the
negotiation with FARC, there was a fluctuating stalemate or negotiation deadlock where the
state could not defeat the guerrilla and the guerrilla could not achieve a revolutionary victory.
According to Zartman, the failure of negotiation highlights his hypothesis that incentives
can only be “effective when parties are sufficient dissatisfied with their present costs” (2001:
301). Talks with FARC showed that they where not hurting enough and were not sufficiently
pessimistic about the future to attend to incentives from the dialogue process. In the same
direction, Rangel (2003) suggests that FARC has greater incentives for staying at war than for
signing an accord; they did not feel militarily powerless. This view, matches Zartman idea:
FARC were not hurting enough and they see their negotiation position as a way to strengthen
their military power instead of hearing incentives.
The case of FARC is interesting. Many suggest that there is no military solution to the conflict.
Why? On the one hand, FARC know much better the territory of Colombia. Four decades in the
mountains make them masters of Colombia’s geography. The Armed Forces are just beginning to
penetrate in FARC controlled zones (most of them in the jungle). That gives a strategic advantage
to FARC. In addition, FARC has fought for 40 years and are patient in achieving their goals. Their
idea of time is lax while the government’s temporality responds to presidential periods: four-year
goals. FARC is waiting to win a military victory and have few incentives to negotiate a settlement
in the short term. As Rangel suggests, their strategy was not to meet an accord but to dilate the
demilitarised zone to strengthen their army, and hurt the state.
The stalemate and deadlock was a result of the format of negotiation: “negotiating amidst
war”. Who benefits from this format? FARC suggests that the government used such strategy
in order to achieve a military victory and neglected the real socio-economic solutions to the
nation. The government suggests that such strategy was viable to negotiate and reach accords
step-by-step, ending with a ceasefire. Both lost and won from this strategy. FARC lost their
political opportunity to achieve structural reforms and participate in their design and won time
to strengthen their military forces and continue their strategy of a military victory. The govern-
ment lost its credibility and an opportunity to negotiate a settlement and won international
support and confidence in a further military strategy.
With broken negotiations with FARC, AUC took 10 months to decide to negotiate. In De-
cember 2002 they were already more than 12,000 combatants. However, there was not a hurt-
ing stalemate. During the three years of peace process they were targeted by Armed Forces, as
demanded by FARC, yet the state ability to rein them in was minimal and they kept their force
with almost null damages.
The reason to negotiate is not linked to the relation of forces between the state and the self-
defence group but to the potential hurting stalemate they can create. What I mean is that the
military incentive to negotiate is part of AUC fundaments: to eliminate guerrillas and preserve
the status quo. The presidential program of Uribe is the legitimacy of the state based on security
and active role of Armed Forces. From the beginning he has focused on military actions against
insurgents. As part of it, he increases military income (from about 1.8% of GDP in 2000 toJUANITA VILLAVECES 21
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4,5% in 2003).34 In addition, he searches to increase troops by about 20% that is, 35,000 sol-
diers in the following years.35 This policy can be accelerated by AUC demobilisation, incorpo-
rating demobilised AUC’s combatants in the Armed Forces. AUC believes in Armed Forces and
in government strategy to defeat guerrillas. Their raison d’être has not changed, what has changed
is their strategy. Government engaged in a security policy, together with paramilitaries’ exper-
tise might jointly fight against guerrilla. This is the goal of the government and has been the
objective of paramilitaries since the beginning. In addition, as suggested by Pécaut, the ceasefire
declared by AUC insinuates that Armed Forces are targeting guerrillas leaving paramilitaries
out of their military objectives.36
The military idea of a hurting stalemate to initiate negotiations is far from explaining why
AUC decided to dialogue. The military incentive of AUC is the opportunity to join president
Uribe’s strategy and legalize their fight after their demobilisation. By contrast, the absence of a
real hurting stalemate between FARC and the government generates a disincentive to reach
accords among them and fosters the military campaign of both parties.
3.3 THIRD-PARTY PARTICIPATION
 “With parties mobilized for warfare, polarization becomes extremely high, making negotiations more diffi-
cult. When leaders are in strong position to deliver on their bargains, a space remains for meaningful negotia-
tions, but efforts already sunk in violent action limit the room for manoeuvre. Under these circumstances,
third-party actors play a critical potential role in increasing communications and using various pressures and
incentives to promote opportunities for bargaining” Rothchild (2003, pp 61):
What has been third-party participation in Colombian peace negotiation?
FARC negotiation did not involve, in the beginning, third parties. Specifically, international
intervention was minimal: U.S through Plan Colombia and in the late phase of the peace talks,
European Countries. Furthermore, FARC disliked international community and viewed it as
explicit supporters of the Colombian state, all being capitalist states. They were sceptical of
international community neutrality and that was why they preferred to keep them out of the
negotiation”.37 FARC only accepted an eventual participation of the international community
as verificators of signed commitments between the parties.
The principal international participation during FARC’s peace process was the U.S assis-
tance package called Plan Colombia. As mentioned above, FARC reaction to Plan Colombia was
negative and fostered their unwillingness to bargain. This type of international intervention
was not a program to support peace efforts or create confidence between parties but was dis-
proportionately skewed toward antinarcotic efforts.
34 Figures from: El País (2003) “Colombia invierte poco en Seguridad”, (Jul, 19 2003) in, http://elpais-
cali.terra.com.co/paisonline/notas/Julio192003/B119N1.html and D. Pécaut (2003). Midiendo Fuerzas. Balance
del primer año de gobierno de Alvaro Uribe Velez. (Bogotá: Editorial Planeta), pp 49.
35 D. Pécaut (2003). Midiendo Fuerzas. Balance del primer año de gobierno de Alvaro Uribe Velez. (Bogotá: Editorial
Planeta), pp 95.
36 D. Pécaut (2003), pp 147.
37 A. Rangel (2003) Guerreros y Políticos. Diálogo y Conflicto en Colombia 1998-2002. (Bogotá: Intermedio Editores),
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In addition, as Mason (1996, pp 553) suggests, “if other nations intervene militarily on one
side or the other in a civil war, the likelihood of a negotiated settlement should decrease”. In
FARC negotiation, the participation of the US through Plan Colombia created a climate of
dissatisfaction among FARC leaders. U.S intervention has not been a neutral intervention. As
most scholars suggest, military intervention may reduce the probability of a negotiated settle-
ment, even more, it may promote the withdrawal from the talk table. In Colombia, the re-
sources of Plan Colombia have served to strengthen the military probability to achieve a victory
and to diminish the likelihood of peace negotiation.
In January 2001, FARC accepted international participation in the figure of “Facilitating
Group”.38 The main achievement of this “Facilitating Group” was to conciliate both sides
when the government decided to end negotiations in January 2002 and re-enter in the demilitarised
zone. The main confidence built by this group was to guarantee no military “invasion” to the
zone and security within it. Their following task was to be part of ceasefire negotiation, how-
ever the decision of FARC to hijack a commercial airline and kidnap the head of Colombian
senate’s Peace Commission blurred the active participation of international community.
The third party participation attempt to generate confidence among parties was timid in the
case of FARC’s peace process. At the beginning of talks, there was no room to intervene in the
process due to the negative of FARC’s leaders to involve international community. Later, third
party participation had no sufficient leverage and legitimacy in the light of FARC to have
strong peace negotiation manoeuvre.
The Plan Colombia, understood as international participation, was not aiming to end the con-
flict in a negotiated way but by military means. Plan Colombia is not committed to peace initiatives,
and instead of creating confidence among parties it exacerbates the distrust within them.
On the other hand, AUC announced from the beginning their willingness to involve international
community in the peace process. However, as stated above, AUC members, among them Castaño,
are being sought for extradition, accused of shipping cocaine to the United States since 1997.
However, what seemed hard to solve, has been smoothened in the past weeks. The U.S
reaction to the starting peace process was, if not enthusiastic at least positive: according to
Caballero (2003, pp 29) the U.S “supposedly stated that peace talks between AUC and the
Uribe government should take priority over ongoing efforts to put Castaño and Mancuso on
trial in a U.S courtroom on drug-trafficking charges”. The U.S ambassador, Anne Patterson,
says that the U.S government will donate $3 to $4 million to support the disarming of AUC
troops, indicating the Washington approval to the peace talks with AUC.
Castaño now claims he wants to join the war on drugs, and to prove his commitment, he
says he wants U.S officials to attend the next round of peace talks with the Uribe government:
“we want to let them know that they can count on our legitimised movement to cooperate in
the struggle against drug trafficking”.39
38 Conformed by Mexico, Venezuela, Canada, Cuba, Germany, Switzerland, France, Norway, Sweden and Spain.
39 Leader Castaño told to Newsweek. In María Cristina Caballero (2003). “Peace at any Price” Newsweek Vol. CXLII,
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3.4 POLITICAL SYSTEM
Shugart and Hartlyn state that the opening of political system in Colombia was favourable for
the decision of laying down arms and negotiating with the government during the nineties. How-
ever, what was an incentive for the M-19 was not one for FARC. After the unexpected electoral
support to the new political movement M-19, this party almost disappeared from the political
game. Their initial success was blurred by several circumstances including the assassination of its
presidential candidate, Carlos Pizarro. One decade after M-19 laid down arms, their political
movement is absent in national elections and has a minimal success in local elections.
In addition, the political party created in the eighties by Colombian left and FARC members,
Unión Patriótica, died on the hands of extremists. Both events, the M-19 collapse as a party and
the political persecution to the UP blurred political participation as a viable incentive to nego-
tiate. Marulanda says “we will never commit the same mistakes from the past”40 referring to the
fate of the M-19 and the UP. That is, while negotiating they will strengthen their ‘clandestine’
movement: Movimiento Bolivariano por la Nueva Colombia, a political movement that attempts to
unify peasant and rural supporters. In addition, FARC leader affirms that they will not partici-
pate in elections unless a political reform includes a constituency to draw a new constitution
and inclusion to institutional power.
However, the discourse of FARC does not reveal their real possibilities of competing in
elections. On the one hand, FARC knows their shortcoming. They have lived in the logic of war
during the past 40 years and they do not expect opportunities in the political game. Elections
are not sufficient for them to decide to negotiate. FARC is aware that they have great chances
to be defeated in elections. Their support is among peasants; most of them absent from the
political game, and the two-party system dominated the electoral game making it hard for new
parties to succeed in elections.
Political incentives to negotiate, in the case of FARC was not their inclusion in the electoral
game but a political reform including a new Congress structure, power-sharing and social inclu-
sion. In spite of their political discourse FARC never demonstrated a real interest to progress in
political reform topics. The Comisión de Notables presented their recommended points to negoti-
ate. They were clear in the advantage of a constitutional assembly to foster negotiation with
FARC. However, FARC disapproved those recommendations and insisted in their military abil-
ity to reach power and then, implement political reforms. As they said, only a structural reform
will guarantee their possibility to participate in a new political and institutional system, but not
as players and competitors but as winners since the beginning. They seek to change their cur-
rent power to a legitimate and immovable power inside the system.
On the side of AUC, the political incentives are not clear. AUC has declared its unwilling-
ness to become a political party. It might be early to establish their real willingness, however
they have shown interest to support some politicians from different parties rather than express
their ideas as a new political force.
40 Marulanda says: “en lo político, por supuesto, jamás cometeremos los errores del pasado” Cited in L.E. González
(1999) ‘Pastrana Desconoce como Marchar hacia Adelante’, in Corporación Observatorio para la Paz. Las Verdaderas
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3.5 PUBLIC SUPPORT
In Colombia, the previous talks with FARC and the initiation of the negotiation were greatly
supported by citizens. However, as the process developed and showed the lack of commitment
and credibility of FARC, people started to withdraw their support and to demand a non-nego-
tiated resolution (military strategy) to end the conflict. In that sense, president Pastrana initi-
ated his mandate with above average popular support toward his principal aim, the peace process,
and ended with a decreasing support. By contrast, president Uribe, committed with a security
and military strategy to rein in armed groups, has maintained a rating above 70% showing the
popular satisfaction with his policy.
In addition, violent actions committed by FARC have created dissatisfaction among the
population and lost them support among intellectuals, students, grass-roots activists, and urban
middle classes. However they continue to have support in many rural areas.
As Rangel suggests, four years ago people thought that it was impossible to defeat guerrillas
and supported peace dialogues and opposed war. Nowadays, public opinion makes a 180° turn.
People are opposed to dialogues and in favour of war (57% of Colombians feel satisfied with
Armed Forces).41 However public opinion is not totally against dialogues. The great majority of
Colombians is still against a dialogue with FARC, yet the opinion is favourable toward the
dialogue with AUC. Two factors have helped in this support. First, some sectors of public
opinion (such as businessmen, landowners, and the upper class), believe that paramilitaries
were necessary to fight against the guerrilla. Second, the government policy of security in-
creased the confidence in the military forces and the viability of a military victory.
Even though public opinion is not crucial for the decision to negotiate it has effects over the
process and the credibility of a president’s policy, and even more, on forthcoming campaigns.
As stated before, Pastrana campaign was to bring peace and end violent conflict by a negotiated
solution. But public opinion got exhausted after three years of fruitless negotiation during his
government. In the following campaign the peace negotiation issue was partially out of
candidates’discourses. Instead, the discourse of “strong hand” succeeded and convinced a great
number of Colombians that peace is only achievable by military means and by supporting all
instruments strengthening Armed Forces.
3.6 VIOLENCE
The format of the negotiation: no ceasefire affected its prospect. The presence of violence
is not in and of itself a source of failure. In fact, as Pillar suggests, cease-fires are more a part
of the conclusion of negotiation than of its opening, as parties may leave open the possibility
to adjust their relation of power during the peace process. Negotiating in the midst of war with
FARC was costly, and reshaped the negotiation prospects. FARC violence went beyond govern-
ment and public tolerance.
41 According to Latinobarómetro: Armed Forces satisfaction in Colombia is the second highest in Latin America.
Countries such as Argentina and Mexico are below 50% and Chile roughly 50%. Colombia’s figure is only topped
by Brazil with 61%. In Latinobarómetro (2002). Informe de Prensa, in http://www.latinobarometro.org/ano2001/
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For instance, violence during peace negotiation involved external actors: the kidnapping and
assassination of three U.S human rights activists on February 1999, led the U.S to change their
position over the negotiation process and to demand that FARC respond to Colombian authori-
ties before any dialogue could resume.
In addition, violence toward expected targets may be viewed as legitimate and acceptable
(military targets, for instance). That is, it does not change parties’ expectation on the negotia-
tion. However, the panorama changes when unexpected targets are attacked. In this situation,
the dynamic of peace talks can totally change and may impose new obstacles: “…violence
directed towards unexpected targets is more likely to disrupt the negotiations, than violence
directed towards expected targets” (Höglund; 2001: 16). In the case of Colombia, incidents of
violence toward civil society changed government perspective on the talks. The kidnapping of
Senator Gechem Turbay in February 2002 was decisive to break off formal contact with FARC.
This incident was taken as proof of the unwillingness of FARC to find peace throughout nego-
tiations. As a result, the president declared the peace process was over and gave FARC four
hours to withdraw from the demilitarised zone before the Armed Forces reoccupied the zone.
Violence is seen otherwise in the case of AUC. They declared the ceasefire since December
6 2002, before initiating formal peace dialogues. Nowadays, AUC crimes and massacres are
‘selective’ primarily toward guerrilla’s supporters and in the battlefront against guerrilla com-
batants in their mutual territorial fight. The effects of targeting guerrilla are seen or not as
unacceptable violence depending on government position, which is explicitly anti-guerrilla, at
any price. Uribe said referring to guerrillas: caterva de bandidos que no podemos aceptar que sigan
abusando de la patria42 suggesting that his government might accept violence toward guerrilla as
expected targets.
3.7 JURIDICAL GUARANTEES. PARDON OR PUNISHMENT?
As leader of AUC, Castaño has operated with virtual impunity for more than a decade:
massacres, political assassinations, narcotrafficking are just a few of his publicly recognized
crimes.43 In addition, Colombian military officers have been accused of providing tacit and
sometimes active support to the group.
An intense debate has followed the announcement of the negotiation with AUC and the gov-
ernment, pointing out the dissatisfaction of giving amnesty to a recognized murderer and violator
of human rights: “there should be no deals that allow murders to escape punishment” says U.S
Sen. Patrick Leahy of Vermont.44 The current leader of AUC, Salvatore Mancuso, says that the
negotiation will succeed if there are legal guarantees to their members. According to Mancuso, if
the amnesty law is established, about 70% will be ready to enter the peace process.45
42 “Mob of  brigands that we cannot accept that they continue abusing of  our Motherland” Cited in D. Pécaut. Midiendo
Fuerzas. Balance del primer año de gobierno de Alvaro Uribe Velez. (Bogota: Editorial Planeta), p 177.
43 Carlos Castaño accepts many murders and massacres happened in the last decades: among others, the assassination
of the M-19 candidate Carlos Pizarro in 1990. In M. Aranguren (2001). Mi Confesion. Castaño revela sus secretos,
(Bogota: Editorial Oveja Negra).
44 Cited by María Cristina Caballero. “Peace at any Price” in Newsweek Vol. CXLII, No. 6. August 11, 2003, p. 28.
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Uribe’s government shows a strong commitment to negotiate peace with AUC. He presented
and initiative to the Congress aiming to suspend crimes’ sentences (drug trafficking and human
right crimes), proposing alternative sanctions. If approved, the law will beneficiate all members
of armed groups that have declared a ceasefire and participate in a peace process.46 However,
the High Commisionate of United Nations for Human Rights in Colombia declared this pro-
posal unacceptable to the international community.47
No doubt this is the principal incentive of AUC to negotiate with the government. A blanket
pardon for their crimes is more than enough to seat on the table.
3.8 LEARNING FROM PAST EXPERIENCES
In a recent edition of The Economist, it is suggested that, “Mr Castaño is politically more
agile than FARC's leaders. He seems to have concluded that greater international intolerance of
terrorism, and AUC's drug-trafficking were harming his cause. And AUC likes to think that Mr
Uribe's military build up might make vigilantism unnecessary”.48
AUC position passed from being against the government because of its politics of negotiation
with guerrillas to be supporters of the government initiatives and be willing to begin a peace
process. Since their first announcement in December 2002, the tone of their proposal sounds
humble to the public opinion. They proposed to change everything that was unachievable and
highly criticized from the previous negotiation process: in that sense, the way paramilitaries an-
nounced their willingness to negotiate was strategic to gain support. In December 2002, the leader
of AUC stated the interest to meet with the government and a potential negotiating agenda that
included: unilateral ceasefire supposedly starting on December 6; no demilitarised zone but con-
centration zone under public force control; no exchange of prisoners; handover of part of their
controlled land to displaced people; international intervention and U.S participation in the pro-
cess and special programs with UNICEF to reintegrate young and children troop members.
This learning from the former process may foster the advancements of this new negotia-
tion process.
CONCLUSION
Peace negotiations are not static and homogeneous processes. There are driving forces and
complementing factors that may lead illegal armed groups to negotiate. In the case of the
Colombian negotiations, there is not a unique factor having led to failures or progresses of
negotiations. The case of FARC began deadlocked because of the format of negotiating in the
midst of war. FARC found incentives to stay at war instead of reaching a negotiated accord.
They considered viable a military victory and the government forces were not strong enough to
create a ‘hurting stalemate’ and bring FARC to a proactive dialogue. In addition, external par-
ticipation was weak and could not generate confidence and real channels of communication
46 El Tiempo (2003). “Proyecto sobre delitos atroces entra al Congreso”, El Tiempo, August, 22.
47 El Tiempo (2003). “Alerta roja de la ONU a Uribe”, El Tiempo, August, 29.
48 The Economist (2003). ‘Sniffing for Peace’, in http://www.economist.com/displaystory.cfm?story_id=1560092JUANITA VILLAVECES 27
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among parties. Even more, the participation of the United States was not supportive of peace
dialogues but explicitly of a military defeat. This circumstance aided to reduce incentives to
negotiate and instead, routed the peace process to its dead-end.
By contrast, economics does not appear to be determinant of the failure of the peace process.
One may say that inside FARC there is one principal ideology aiming to achieve victory and power
and a fraction that may respond to economic rationality. FARC has existed for several years not
getting involved in illegal narcotic activities and may find alternative financial sources to survive
and continue their fight. By contrast, AUC has claimed their willingness to end drug dealing and
had proposed alternative programs to substitute coca crops. AUC has incentives to negotiate if
they can clean their past illegal gains. Economic incentives are not homogeneous inside armed
groups and are not limited to a cost-benefit related to illegal activities versus negotiation.
In terms of military incentives, neither FARC nor AUC have presented a situation of ‘hurt-
ing stalemate’, a condition to decide to negotiate. FARC took advantage of negotiations to
strengthen their military forces to achieve a victory. The more convinced they are of their
military ability, the less the chances to achieve accords and move forwards in negotiation.
Moreover, AUC military incentive to negotiate is not the result of feeling hurt by the state but
the opportunity to be a legal force joint with the Armed Forces to hurt or defeat FARC.
Political incentives were not significant in the case of any of the two peace processes. FARC
were not expecting electoral incentives. Moreover, they blocked external initiatives to put po-
litical reform in the table. They were not expecting to demobilise in exchange of political inclu-
sion. They were expecting to be in power to reform the political system. In that sense, to offer
real incentives, Colombian political system should dramatically change in order to achieve a
negotiated settlement. It cannot be said that the government refused to give political incen-
tives, they tried, but nothing was enough to FARC. AUC, has not showed a real interest to
participate in politics, this is not a significant incentive for them to negotiate.
Two important issues appear as incentives to negotiate in the case of AUC: judicial guaran-
tees to AUC members and the learning experience from past processes. The first is to guarantee
a blanket pardon to their crimes. Amnesty or pardon is enough to ensure the peace process will
move forward. In addition, they learnt from past experience. They announced a format of
dialogue avoiding all mistakes of FARC negotiation, specially the non-ceasefire. AUC announced
a unilateral ceasefire that changed the public opinion toward peace negotiation, trusting an
armed group that decided to ceasefire.
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